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Trade in Nominal Assets:
Monetary Policy, and Price Level and Exchange Rate Risk
ABSTRACT
In a previous paper, "Trade in Risky Assets," I have analyzed the pattern
of iiiternational trade in risky real assets between barter economies, relyillg
on the Law of Comparative Advantage and using autarky asset price differences
to predict the pattern of asset trade.Iii this paper the analysis is extended
to international trade in nominal assets (assets with returns paid in
currencies) between monetary economies. The risk characteristics of real
returns on nominal assets depend on price level and exchange rate risk, and
therefore on monetary policy. It is examined how different combinations of
monetary policies and exchange rate regimes affect nominal assets' return risk
characteristics, their autarky prices, and hence their trade pattern, when
countries differ with respect to their outputs or their attitudes towards
risk. When when world asset markets are incomplete, different monetary
policies and exchange rate regimes have dramatic effects on risk
characteristicsof home and foreign currency bonds and on the trade pattern in








Inpractice all internationally traded assets are risky. That is, their
real returns are risky and depend,among other things, on risk characteristics
ofprice levels, exchange rates and terms of trade. With increased
liberalization and integration of international capital markets, the
importanceof international trade in risky assets can hardlybe disputed.
Therehas beell considerable work on the determinants ofaggregate capital
movements, for instance in the literature that regards capital movements as
intertemporal trade.' however, there seems to be relatively little research
done on the determinants of the disaggregate pattern of trade in distinct
riskyassets, definitely much less thaii on thedeterminants of the pattern of
tradein goods.
A previous paper of mine, Svensson (1987), discusses the tradepattern in
risky assets between barter economies, by combining the general Law of
ComparativeAdvantage from the literature on international trade in goods with
theliterature onlilternational assetpricillg.2As developedby Deardorff
(1980) and Dixit and Norman (1980)fortrade in goods, the Law of Comparative
Advantage states that there is a correlation between autarky price differences
and the trade pattern such that a country tends to import goods for which the
country's autarky price is high relative to the world market price, or
relative to autarky prices inthe restof the world. When adapted to asset
trade, the law states that there is a tendency for a country to import assets
for which the autarky price is relatively high. Differences in countries'
1 See Persson and Stockman (1987)fora presentation of this approach.
2 See Svensson (1987)forreferences to the relevant literature on
international asset pricing, and for references to the existing (but
relatively small) literature oil the trade pattern in risky assets in barter
economies.2
autarky prices depend on underlying differences between countries. Svensson
(1987) explains how international differences with respect to the stochastic
propertiesof outputs, rates of time preference, attitudes towards risk, and
subjective beliefs determine autarky price differences, and how autarky price
differencesthen determine the pattern of trade in arbitrarily specified
assets, as well as in specific assets like indexed bonds, claims to countries'
output(stocks, equity), and Arrow- Debreu securities.
TheanalysisinSvensson (1987) applies oniy to real assets in barter
economies. Most international assets are iioininal assets, in the sense that
their return is paid in some international currency. Then, the real returns
depend on risk characteristics of price levels and exchange rates, which in
turndepend on, among other things, the risk characteristics of countries'
money supplies.3
This paper extends the aiialysis to include trade in risky nominal assets
between monetary economies. The new element is to study the effect of
monetary policies and price level and exchange rate risk on the real returns
on specified nominal assets in a general-equilibrium setting. The focus is on
how different combinations of monetary policies and exchange rate regimes
determinethe pattern of trade innominal assets by affectingthe risk
3 SeeFama andFarber(1979), Grauer, Litzenberger and Stehie (1976), and
Kouri (1977). These papers take, as is coninion in the finance literature, the
stochasticprocesses for price levels as exogenous, and tile dependenceon
moneysupply in general equilibrium is not integrated into the analysis. Such
anintegration is undertaken intilegeneral- equilibrium international asset
pricingmodels of Lucas (1982),Stulz (1984) and Svensson (1985). Tile focus
inthese papers is on prices and exchange rates and not 011thetrade pattern;
since a perfectly pooled equilibrium is assumed, the trade pattern is trivial.
Thatis, relative to autarky each country (in a two-country world) exports
half of its assets and imports half of tileothercountry's assets. Still,
capitalmovements and correlations between key macro variables like
investment, the current account, output, etc., can be studied, as in Stockman
and Svensson (1987), but any current and capital account movements are due
exclusively to revaluation of domestically based assets relative to foreign
based assets, not to changes in tile ownership of assets.3
characteristics of these assets.
The outliiie of the paper is as follows. Sectioll II lays out a two-period
modelof a two- country world, where home and foreign currencies are introduced
via cash- in- advance constraints. The international asset market is
characterized by the assets' real return risk characteristics, summarizedas a
realreturn matrix. Sections II and III exploit that, for a given real return
matrix, the monetary world equilibriuni is equivalent to an equilibrium in a
world barter economy without money and liquidity constraints. The Law of
Comparative Advantage, relating trade in assets to autarky asset price
differences, can then be applied as in Svenssoii (1987). Section IV discusses
how different monetary polices determine risk characteristics of realreturns
of nominal assets, the real return matrix. These building blocksare combined
in Section V, which examines the determinants of autarky assetprices for the
case when countries differ oniy with respect to the stochastic properties of
their outputs. It presents a simple condition, in terms of the covariances
between output and real asset returns, for the direction of trade ina given
asset with given real return characteristics. Four distinct monetary policies
are specified: the passive (nominal CDP) and tile price-level (inflation rate)
stabilizing policies, and the fixed exchange rate regimes with either a
one-sided or a two-sided peg. In section VI these elements are combined to
examine how different combinations of monetary policies and exchange rate
regimes determine the trade patterii in home and foreign currency bonds, when
countries differ with respect to the risk characteristics of theiroutputs.
Section VII examines the case when the countries differ withrespect to their
attitudes towards risk. Section VIII includes asummary, some conclusions,
and a discussion of limitations and possible extensions of the analysis. An
appendix includes a detailed description of tile cash- in-advance transactions
structure.4
II. Markets andAssets
Weconsider a world with two countries, home and foreign. Each country
consists of a representative consumer and a government. There are two
periods, 1 and 2, and there is one good and two currencies, home and foreign,
in each period. Period 1 outputs inthe home andforeign country, y1 and y*,
are exogenous and certain. Period 2 outputs in the two countries, y2 and y2,
are also exogenous but uncertain. We call tile vector s =(y2,y*2)the state
of the world in period 2. The state of the world is distributed accordingly
to the distribution function F(s). Goods are perishable and there is no
storageor otiier investment technology.
Stochastic outputs is the only source of uncertainty in the model. The
monetarypolicies to bespecified in section Vwill be conditional upon the
stochastic outputs. Tile model caii easily be expanded to consider monetary
policy as an independent source of uncertainty.
The home and foreign countries have access to a world asset market in the
beginning of period 1. On this asset market home and foreign currencies and
assets can be traded. Let us now describe this asset market.
There is a given set J of J cliff erent assets (in addition to home and
foreign currency), which can be traded onthe worldasset market in period 1,
before the uncertainty about tile state oftile world in period 2 has been
resolved.(We let J denote both the set and the number of elements of the
set.)The assets pay a state-dependent return in tile beginning of period 2.
Allassetsare nominal assets. More precisely, they are either home currency
orforeigncurrency assets, in the sensethat theyreturns arepaidin either
home or foreign currency.4 If a particular asset jE Jisa home currency
4 Thedemand formoney willbe introduced via liquidity (cash-in-advance)
constraints.Assets whopay returns physically in goods can then not be
allowed, since they would provide a way toavoid the liquidity constraints,
andremove any demand for money.5
asset,it ischaracterized by a (gross) home currency return function Ri(s)
givingthe amount of home currency it pays in the beginning of period 2 as a
functionof the state. Ifinstea,d a particular asset je J isa foreign
currencyasset, ithasa (gross) foreign currency return function R(s) giving
theamount of foreign currency it pays in the beginning of period 2 as a
function of the state. The most important characteristic of an asset will be
its real return measured in the one good, however. Let the home and foreign
currency price of goods in states in period 2be denoted by P2(s) and P*2(s),
respectively. Then, the (gross) (real) return function ri(s) for a given




dependingupon whether the asset is a homeor foreign currency asset. We see
thatthe real return on a home currency asset in general depends on the home
price level, and that the real return on aforeigncurrency asset in geiieral
depends on the foreign pricelevel. hence, iiigeneral the real returns will
beendogenously determined inequilibrium.
Let us consider some special assets. A homecurrencybond (more
precisely a home currency discountbond) pays one unit of home currency in all
states in period 2.It will be denoted by j=inandhas the home currency
returnfunction R(s) =1for all s. hence, its real return function r111(s) is
givenby
(2.2a)r(s) =1/P2(s),for all s.
That is, its real return is the reciprocal of the home price level. This
implies that the risk characteristics of home currency bonds depends directly
on the risk characteristics of the home price level, which in turn depend on
the suppiy and demand of home currency.5
5Letbe the home currency price on the asset market in period 1 of a
home currency bond. Theii the nominal interest rate i111 on a home currency bond6
Similarly,a foreign currency bond, denoted j =n,has the foreign
currency return function R(s) =1for all s, and the real return function
r11(s) given by
(2.2b) r11(s) =1/P*2(s),for all s.
The risk characteristics of the foreign currency bond depend directly on the
risk characteristics of the foreign price level and hence on the demand and
supply for foreign currency.6
Let us also consider some real assets, assets that although they pay in
homeor foreign currency have real returns that are independent of the
countries' price levels. That is, their currency returns are, directly or
indirectly, indexed. The indexed bond (denoted j=0)has the home currency
return function R0(s) =P2(s)or tile foreign currencyreturn function R(s)
p*2(s).That is, its real return is unity in each state,
(2.2c)r0(s) =1,for all s.
Home stocks (j=h)are claims to (the home currency value of) home (period 2)
output. They are a home currency asset with the home currency return function
Rh(s)P2(s)y2. Hence the real return function rh(s) is given by
(2.2d)rh(s) =y2,for all
Similarly,foreign stocks (j =f)are a foreign currency asset with the
foreign currency return function R(s) =P*2(s)y*2.Hence the real return
function is given by
(2.2e) rf(s) =y*2,for all s.
Let us finally note that au Arrow-Debreu security for a particular state
is given by Q =1/(1+i111).
6 Thereal return on a foreign currency bond can also be expressed in terms
ofthe period 2 exchange rate instates, e2(s), and the home price level as
r11(s) =e2(s)/P2(s),hence depending onexchangerate and homeprice-level
risk. However, in equilibriuiii inourmodel the Law of One Price will hold, so
thisis the same expression as (2.2b).7
s isan asset that pays eitherP2(s) units of homecurrency or P*2(s) units of
foreign currency in the particular state s, and that pays nothing in other
states. Hence, therealreturn function is given by
(2.2f) r5(o) =1for o- =s,r5()
=0foro s, for all states o.
An Arrow-Debreu security pays a real return equal to unity in one particular
state only.
The set J of assets available for trade on the world asset market is
completely characterized by the assetst real return vectors. Let us consider
the (real) return (generalized) lilatrix r consisting of the J real return
functions r(s) jeJ. When tile number of states of the world, S, is finite,
this is an ordinary (SxJ)-matrix, with S rows and J columns. When the number
of states S is infinite, we can still think of a r as a generalized matrix
withinfinitely many rows. The components of the return matrix are exogenous
to consumers trading on tile world asset market, but some or all of the
componentsare endogenously determined in an equilibrium. Therefore, it will
bepractical to express individual behavior as conditional upon an arbitrarily
given return matrix. In equilibrium the given return matrix must of course
coincide with the actual equilibrium return matrix as it is determined by
price levels and monetary policies, for instance.
In principle the trade pattern in any given set of assets, complete or
incomplete, can be examined with our methods. In sections VI and VII we shall
however restrict the analysis to the special case when the set of assets
include only home and foreign currency bonds (J ={iu,n}).Since we will
assume that there are more the two states of the world, the set of assets then8
considered is incomplete.7
Having described the asset market and some possible assets, we shall now
lookmore closely at the home consumer and the constraints he faces. The home
consumer has rational expectations and knows the probability distribution F(s)
over the states of the world. He has preferences over period 1 consumption,
c,and state-dependent period 2 consumption,c2(s). The preferences can be
representedby the additively separable expected utility function
(2.3) U(c1) +flE[U(c2)],
where U(.) is a standard increasing concave sufficiently differentiable von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, >0is is the subjective discount
factor, and E[a] denotes the expected value Ja(s)dF(s).8
Theconsumer is entitled to cash revenues from the sale of home output.
The sequence of transactions and payments is such that he does not receive
these revenues until at the end of each period, whereas he must provide cash
in advance to purchase goods inthe beginning of each period.9 The precise
7 Werecall that the set o-f assets is said to be complete if the rank of
the return matrix r is S, that is, if there are as many independent assets
(that is, with linearly independent return vectors) as there are states of the
world.Then consumers can reach the same consumption allocation across states
ofthe world with trade on the asset market as they can if they have access to
the S Arrow-Debreu securities. If the rank of the return matrix is less
than S,theset of assets is said to be incomplete.
8 Asis well known, representing preferences by an additively separable
expected utility function does not allow a separation between risk aversion
and interteinporal substitution in consumption (see Sandmo (1974) and
Selden (1978)).
The model is similar to the ones of Helpman (1981) (except it has
uncertainty and oniy two periods), 1!elpman and Razin (1982) (except it has no
uncertainty in period 1), Lucas (1982) (except it has possibly incomplete
markets and only two periods), Persson (1982, 1984) (except ithasuncertainty
and only two periods), and Stockinan (1983) (except it has cash in advance
instead of money in the utility function).9
sequence of markets and transactions is described in the appendix. There it
isalso shown thattile resulting equilibrium with money is identical to the
equilibriuniin theanalog barter economy.'°Therefore we can hereproceed to
define the equilibriuni without aiiy reference to money. Money and monetary
policywillbe introduced inSection V.
Letxdenote the homecountry's (net) import of goods in period 1. Then
consumption in period 1 fulfills
(2.4) c1 =y1+
Letthe J-vector z =(z)denote the home country's (net) import of asset on
the asset market in period 1.11 Then consumption in period 2 fulfills
(2.5)c2(s) y +r(s)z,for all s,
where r(s)z denotes the innerproduct Ejr(s)z. Substitution of (2.4) and
(2.5) into (2.3) allows us to define the trade utility function U(x,z;r),
conditional on a givenreturn matrix r, by
(2.6) U(x,z;r) =U(y1+x)+E[U(y2+rz)].




is the J-vector of asset prices measured in period 1goodsand
qz denotes the inner product Thisequation can be interpreted as a
balance-of-payments constraint, stating that thethecurrent account deficit,
x, and the capital account deficit, qz, suni to zero.
10Thisequivalence result for a cash-in-advance economy with given output
is demonstrated in tile perfect-foresight case by Helpman (1981).
11Itis practical to let z denote only the net international trade of the
consumer,andto let his initial holdings of domestic assets (claims to period
1and period2output)be implicitly givenintile right-hand sides of his
constraints (2.4) arid (2.5).10
The behavior of the home coiisuiner can now be described as the result of
maximizing the trade utility fuiiction (2.6) subject to the budget constraint
(2.7), for given asset prices q, and for a given return matrix r. This
results in goods import arid asset import functions x(q;r) and z(q;r) •12
12 Weassume that these functions are single-va1ued. This does not matter
forour results, but simplifies the notation.
Also, we disregard bankruptcy issues, by not restricting consumption to
be non-negative.11
III. Equilibrium andtheLawof Comparative Advantage
A home country autarky equilibrium for a given return matrix r, is an
equilibrium without access to theworldasset market. That is, asset import
is zero,
(3.1) z(q;r) =0.
(Import of period 1 goods is then also zero, x(q;r) =0,but by Wairas's Law
that equation is redundant.) Equation (3.1) can be solved for the home
autarky asset prices q, for a givenreturn matrix r.13
The foreign country has a trade utility function over period 1 goods
(net) import x and asset (net) import z, U*(x*,z*;r), defined by the analog
to (2.6). Its period 1 budget constraint is the analog to (2.7).
Maximization of the foreign country's trade utility function subject to its
period 1 budget constraint gives foreign country's goods and asset import
functions x*(q;r) and z*(q;r). An autarkv equilibrium for the foreign
country, for a given return matrix r, is an autarky asset price vector q* that
fulfills the analog of (3.1).
In a world equilibrium, fiiially, home and foreign asset import sum to
zero, that is
(3.2) z(q;r) +z*(q;r) 0.
Equation (3.2) can be solved for tileworldequilibrium asset prices, for a
given return matrix r. (By Walras's Law the world market for period 1 goods
is in equilibrium whenever the asset market is in equilibrium.)
The equilibria defined are conditional upon a given return matrix r.It
remains to restrict the return matrix to be consistent with the monetary
13Thereis no contradiction in considering the home autarky price of a
foreign currency asset. The foreign currency asset is defined by a real
return vector that is here taken as exogenous. The autarky price of any asset
with a given real return vector is the equilibrium asset price for which zero
trade is an equilibrium.12
policies pursued. Before that is (lone, we shall contiiiue to take the set of
assets and the return matrix as given and proceed, exactly as in Svensson
(1987), to apply the Law of Comparative Advantage.
For a given return matrix r, the barter economies described by the trade
utility function (2.3) and its foreign analog, and the budget constraint (2.7)
and its foreign analog, are formally equivalent to static barter economies
trading J+1 commodities. Therefore, the standard international trade theorems
apply, for instance the Gains-from--Trade Theorem and the Law of Comparative
Advantage. Let us therefore directly apply the Law of Comparative Advantage,
inthe general form advanced by Deardorff(1980) and Dixit and Norman (1980),
tothe present circumstances.?
Let z be the home country's import of period 1 goods and assets in a
worldequilibrium, and let q and q* be home and foreign autarky asset prices
relative to period 1 goods. Then the Law of Comparative Advantage can be
written on the form
(3.3) (q_q*)z ￿ 0.
It states thaton theaverage, the home countrywill import assets whose
autarkyprices are higher in the home country than in the foreign country. If
oniyoneasset is traded we have an exactrelation between autarky asset
prices and the trade pattern: Tile asset will be imported (and period 1 goods
will be exported) if and oniy if the autarky price of the asset is higher in
the home country than in the foreign country. If more than one asset are
traded, the Law of Comparative Advantage provides a "tendency" for a
particular asset to be imported if its autarky price is relatively high,13
ratherthan an exact relation for import in anyindividualasset.'4
'"AsDeardorff (1980) emphasizes, a positive inner product ab =Eab
￿ 0
does not exactly provide a positive correlation between the J-vectors a =(a)
and b =(b)
unless either Ea =0or =0.This is so, since the
sample correlation coefficient cor(a,b) is proportional to the sample
covariance cov(a,b) and the latter fulfills cov(a,b) =ab-aEb/J.
Deardorffshows how one can construct correlations in two ways. One way is to
exploitthe balance-of-payments constraint. Let qt be the asset prices in
terms of goods in the world equilibrium. Then (3.3)isequivalent to the
statementthat the (J+1)-vectors (0,((q-q/q)) and (x,(qz)) are
positively correlated, since x +qtz=0.The other way is to restrict the
vector of goods and asset prices to be in the unit simplex. Let (p,q) and
(p*,q*) be the home and foreign autarky prices of period 1 goods and assets.
The standard derivation of the Law of Comparative Advantage gives
(p_p*,q.q*)(x,z)0. Restricting (p,c) and (p*,q*) to be in the unit simplex
then implies that the (J+1)-vectors ((1,q)/(1÷q) - and
(x,z) are positively correlated.
For our purpose it is sufficient to interpret (3.3) as stating that there
is tendency for asset j to be imported into the home country (z >0)when its
home autarky price (measured in goods) is higher than its foreign autarky
price (measured in goods) (q >q).14
IV.AutarkyAsset Prices and Output Differences
In this section we shall look at tile determinants of autarky asset
prices. For the case of countries differing only in their period 2 outputs,
we shall make simplifying assumptions so as to be able to derive a simple and
operational condition, in terms of covariances of outputs and asset returns,
for the autarky asset price of a particular asset to be lower in one country.
The home autarky asset priceq
of a particular asset jwithreturn
function ri(s) is simply given by the marginal rate of substitution between
asset jandperiod 1 goods of the trade utility function (2.6) at zero import
of goods and assets, Ui(OO;r)/U(OO;r) where U and U denote the partial
with respect toz




the familiar expression of the discounted expected utility of period 2 returns
over the marginal utility of period 1 consumption.
It is practical to relate the price of a asset to the real interest rate
on an indexed bond, and to the risk measure for the asset. First, consider
the indexed bond, with returns r0(s) =1for all s. Its autarky price, q0,
and the corresponding autarky real interest rate, p, fulfill, by (4.1),
(4.2) q0 =l/(l+p)=E[U(y2)]/U(y1).
Second, define the autarky risk measure for asset j,llj,
as
(4.3) ll =-Cov[U(y2)r]/E[U(y2).
Third, use the rule E[xy] =E[x]E[y]+ Cov[x,y] to rewrite (4.1), and apply
the definitions (4.2) and (4.3). This gives
(4.4) q ={E[r]
-Il}/(l+).
We see that the asset price can be written as the present value of the
differencebetween its expected return and itsrisk measure.
Therisk measure (4.3) is proportional tothe negative of the covariance15
betweenthe marginal utilities of consumption U(y2) and the returns
ri(s).
Hence it is positive or negative depending upon whether period 2 marginal
utilities and returns are negatively or positively correlated. The risk
measure for an asset can be interpreted as a measure of how risky that asset
is relative to the indexed bond. If the risk measure is positive, the asset
is riskier than the indexed bond. If it is negative, the asset is less risky
than the indexed bond.'5 16
It is clear from (4.4) that autarky prices for a
across countries because autarky real interest rates,
or both differ across countries. More precisely, the
interest rate and the risk measure for asset j should
the asset to have a higher home autarky price and for
a tendency to import the asset.
Let us first consider the effect of different autarky real interest
Let thehome autarky real interest rate be lower than the foreign
real interest rate. Then, for all assets which do not have higher
risk measure at home than abroad, home autarky asset prices will be
15The risk premium can be defined as the difference between the expected
gross rate of return, E[r]/q., and the gross real rate of interest, l+p.
Then the risk premium is equa toll/q and fulfills ll/q =
-flCov[U(Y2)/U(Y1)r
/qJ and is hence the negative of the covariance
between the marginal rates of substitution and the ex post rates of
return r(s)/q.
16Notethat the indexed bond has a sure real return, but that the utility
valueofthe return is risky, siiice marginal utility itself is risky. Hence
there is nothing paradoxical with assets that are less risky than the indexed
bond. A sure-utility bond (in autarky) (j =u)would have returns rn(s)
fulfilling U(y2)r(s) =1,hence rn(s) 1/Uc(y2) for all s.








higher, and there is hence a tendency for the home country to import all such
assets. For assets with a higher autarky risk measure at home, a lower home
autarky real interest rate implies a higher autarky price but not necessarily
higher than the foreign autarky price. Nevertheless, we may state that a
lower home autarky real interest rate implies a tendency to import (almost)
all assets into the home country, to run a capital account deficit and hence
be a net lender. If the only asset traded is the indexed bond, we have an
exact result and know for sure that the the home country will import the
indexed bond and be a net lender.
Let us next turn to differences in autarky risk measures. From (4.4) we
see that, for autarky real interest rates not higher at home than abroad, a
lower risk measure at home for asset j implies a higher home autarky asset
price and hence a tendency for asset j to be imported by the home country.
For autarky real interest rates higher at home than abroad, a lower home
autarky risk measure implies a higher autarky asset price, but not necessarily
higher than in the foreign country. Risk terms are specific to individual
assets and depend on the individual risk characteristics of the asset. Hence
a difference between risk measures for a given asset gives information about
trade in that specific asset; a difference in autarky real interest rates
affect autarky asset prices for all assets, and hence gives information about
aggregate asset trade, the capital account.
If the countries are identical in all respects, the autarky asset prices
will be identical, there is no basis for trade, and zero trade will be a trade
equilibrium. Hence, trade here arises because of differences between the
countries. The countries can differ either with regard to their outputs,
their preferences (including their subjective probability distributions), and
with regard to their monetary policies. In Svensson (1987) differences in all
these respects, except monetary policies, are considered. Here we shall, in17
addition to differences in monetary policies, only discuss differences between
countries with regard to output/technology (section VI) and with regard to
attitudes towards risk (section VII).
In Svensson (1987) differences in both autarky real interest rates and
risk measures are extensively discussed. In the present setup, as
demonstrated in the appendix, monetary policy and price level risk does not
affect autarky real interest rates. Therefore, in order to isolate and
highlight the effect of monetary policies we shall make assumptions that
ensure that autarky real interest rates are the same, and hence that then only
reason for autarky asset price differences is differences in autarky risk
measures.
We therefore make the following assumptions:
(Al) The home and foreign countries are identical in all respects except
with regard to period 2 outputs.
(A2) Home and foreign period 2 outputs have the same marginal probability
distribution but are imperfectly correlated.
It follows directly from and assumptions (Al) and (A2) and equations
(4.3) and (4.4) that the two countries will have the same autarky real
interest rate,
(4.5) p =p.
Then autarky price differences for a particular asset j depends only on
autarky risk measure differences.
Under the following assumptions we get a very simple expression for the
measures:
The vOll Neumann-Morgenstern utility function has constant absolute
risk aversion, that is,
U(c) =
where'= Ucc/Ucthe Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk
risk
(A3)18
aversion, is a positive constant.
(A4) For all assets jeJ, (Y2r(s)) and (y2r.(s)) are jointly
normally distributed.17
Under assumption (A3) and (A4) it is easy to show that the home autarky
risk measure fulf ills'8
(4.6) ll =7Cov[y2,r].
The autarky risk measure is simply the product of the absolute risk aversion
parameterandthe covariance between its return and home period 2 output.
Therefore, under assumptions (A1)-(A4) we can summarize our results as
(4.7)
llll Cov[Y2r]Cov[y*Z,r] I'"zj0,
where""denotes"implies a tendency to."
Hence, if an assets return is less positively correlated, or more
negatively correlated, with home period 2 output than with foreign period 2
output, there is a tendency for the asset to be imported by the home country.
Ifthe asset is the only asset traded wehave an exact result and know for
surethatit will be imported by the home country. We note the simplicity of
(4.7) inthat itdependsonly on the return vector for the asset inquestion
andnot on the return vectors of other assets. This is of course because the
asset price andriskmeasure are computed in autarky, when there is zero trade
in all assets. The simplicity of (4.7) illustrates the convenience in using
the Law of Comparative Advantage.
17Asusual, the assumption of a normal distribution is problematic, since
it implies that period 2 outputs can take negative values with positive
probability. With small variances relative to means, it is a minor problem,
though.
18Underassumption (A4) a theorem by Rubinstein (1976) implies that ll =
= -Cov[U(y2),r]/E[U(y2)]= Under
assumption (A3) we have U(y2) =-7U(y2),hence(4.6).19
V. MonetaryPolicy
Demand for currencies is introduced via cash-in-advance constraints. The
rule is that home goods must be purchased with home currency, and foreign
goods with foreign currency (this is the S-system in Helpman and Razin
(1984)). The details are spelled out in the appendix. Here we need oniy
concern ourselves with the resulting period 2 price level equations. Under
the assumption that nominal interest rates are positive, the price level
equations are the familiar quantity-theory (-of-money) equations
(5.1) P2(s)=t2(s)/y2and P*2(s) =N2(s)/y*2,for all s,
whereM2(s) and N2(s) are the home and foreign molletary supplies in state Sin
period 2.
Wealso note that in equilibrium the Law of One Price must hold. If it
would not, home and foreign consumers would in this setup shift all their
demand towards goods from one country. Hence,
(5.2) P2(s) =e2(s)P*2(s),foralls.
It follows from (5.1)-(5.2) that the period 2 exchange rate equation is
(5.3) e2(s) =(M2(S)/N2(S))(y*2/y2),for all s.
We have already noted that for nominal assets real returns depend on
period 2 price levels. Thus front the expression for the real returns on home




Hence the stochastic properties of the return on a bond nominated in a
country's currency is completely determined by the stochastic properties of
the country's period 2 money supply and output.
In order to know the relevant real returns on nominal assets we therefore
need to specify the monetary policies we want to consider. Obviously a large20 Printed October 13, 1987
number of different monetary policies can be examined. We shall only specify
a small set of four simple bench-mark monetary policies, the consequences of
which for the trade pattern in nominal assets we shall examine in sections VI
and VII.
It is practical to distinguish between independent and coordinated
monetary policies, independent meaning that policy in one country is
independent of variables in the other country, and coordinated meaning that
policy in one country depends on variables from both countries. Among
possible independent policies, let us only consider output-dependent monetary
policy with a constant elasticity k of home money supply with respect to home
output, that is,19
(5.5) 2() =(2)kfor all s.
We can refer to the case k > 0 as a pro-cyclical monetary policy, and k < 0 as
a counter-cyclical monetary policy. The case k =0can be called a passive
monetary policy, with money supply constant and state-independent,
(5.6a) I2(s) =1,for all s.
Equivalently, in view of (5.1) we caii say that this policy stabilizes nominal
GDP. This is the first monetary policy shall examine below.
We can also conceive of price-level related monetary policies, policies
that are designed to have particular effects on the price level. The second
monetary policy we shall coiisider is the special case of a price-stabilizing
monetary policy, the output-dependent policy for which the elasticity k equals
unity and the price level is constant,
(5.6b) M2(s) =y2and P2(s) =1,for all s.
Equivalently, we can call this an inflation-stabilizing policy.
19Since only the risk characteristics of period 2 price levels and returns
matter, that is, their dependence on the state of the world, any
multiplicative constant for the money supply is irrelevant. For simplicity we
set the constant equal to unity in (5.5).21 Printed October 13, 1987
Among coordinated monetary policies we have the exchange-rate related
monetary policies, policies that are designed to affect the exchange rate.
From the exchange rate equation iii (5.3) we have that for a particular
exchange rate target 2(s) for all s, home and foreign monetary policy must
fulfill
(5.7) M2(s) =é2(s)N2(s)y2/y*2,for all s.
A special case is the fixed exchaiige rate regime when the target exchange rate
is constant (state- independent), e2(s)e for all s, for which case the
monetary policies must fulfill
(5.8) M2(s) =N2(s)y2/y*2,for all s.
The third monetary policy we shall consider is the one-sided ,thefixed
exchange rate regime in which the foreign country pursues an output-dependent
monetary policy, and the home country sets money supply according to (5.8) so
as to hold the exchange rate constant, that is,
2 2 k* -2 -2*2 k*_1
(5.9) N (s) =(y*)andM (s) =ey(y), forall s.
The fourth policy is the two-sided peg, the fixed exchange rate regime in
which the two countries cooperate so as to hold the world money stock, M,
constant ,20
(5.10) M2(s) + N2(s) =I,for all s.
From (5.8) and (5.10) it follows that the monetary policies must then fulfill
(5.11) 12(s) =1y2/(y2+y*2) and N2(s) =(M/)y2/(y2+ y*2), for all s.
Each country's money supply is adjusted so as to be in proportion to the
country's share in world period 2 output.
In the appendix the governments' policy instruments are restricted to be
money supply and (net) transfers. Neither open market operations nor foreign
20Holding the world money stock I constant is of course a special case.
Output dependent world money stocks can be considered, for instance.22 Printed October 13, 1987
exchange interventions are considered. however, open market operations and
foreign exchange interventions (assuming that foreign reserves are interest
bearing foreign currency bonds rather than non- interest bearing foreign
currency) are neutral as long as they result in the same money supply.21 This
is so, since the home and foreign countries as modeled are characterized by
Ricardian Equivalence (there are no distortioiiary taxes, money is not
distortionary, there are rational expectations, and the consumers' horizon is
aslong as the horizon of the economies)and since with the given transactions
structure, each country's consumer chooses not to hold any of the other
country'scurrency between the periods (see appendix). Put differently, the
onlythings that matter for price levels and exchange rates, and hence real
returns, are the home and foreign currency supplies, (M1,M2(s)) and (N1,N2(s))
(this is obvious from the quantity equations (5.1) and the exchange rate
equation(5.3)). hence, whether we allowsuch interventions or not in the
present framework is for our purpose irrelevant.22
Monetary policy can here be regarded as "pure" monetary policy, without
any implicitly associated fiscal policy. This is so even though the money
21In the transactions structure laid out in the appendix the home consumer
chooses not to hold any foreign currency between period 1 and period 2.lIe
effectively holds all home currency between the periods, since it is held by
home firms to be distributed to home consumers in the beginning of period 2.
Therefore, an expansion of the home money stock does not imply any inflation
tax on the foreign consumer. That is also the reason why any private currency
flowsdo not appear in the balance of payments (2.7).
22SeeHelpman (1981) and Persson (1982, 1984) for a detailed discussion on
differentexchange rate regimes and different kinds of central bank
interventionin similar perfect-foresight models. Stockman (1983)
demonstrates in a similar uncertainty model, although with real balances in
the utility function, that a sterilized intervention has no effect on exchange
rates and price levels when Ricardian Equivalence obtains.
Sinceit is the period 2 exchange rates and price levels that are
relevantfor the risk characteristics of asset returns in our two-period
model, and there are no assets except home and foreign currency traded in
period2, the set of possible interveutions in period 2 would in any case be
limited.23 Printed October 13, 1987
supplyischanged by net transfers to consumers, which usually implies that
monetaryand fiscal policy cannot he separated. The reason is that the
monetary structure laid out iii the appendix assumes that all monetary
transfers received during period 1 and2are taxed at 1OO7atthe end of
period 2.24
VI. Trade in Nominal Assets: Output Differences
In section IV we derived tile simple covariance criterion (4.7) for
whether there will be a tendency for the home country to import or export a
particular asset with given risk characteristics, that is with a given real
return vector, when countries differ only with respect to period 2 outputs.
In section V we noted that the risk characteristics of the real returns of
home and foreign currency are completely determined by the risk
characteristics of period 2 outputs and money supply, and we specified four
bench-mark monetary policies to be considered: the independent passive and
price-level stabilizing monetary polices, and the coordinated one-sided peg
and two-sided peg. At last we are ready to use these building blocks to
discuss how combinations of monetary polices determine the trade pattern in
home and foreign currency bonds.
Hence, we assume that the set of assets consist only of home and foreign
currency bonds, that is J ={m,n},and consider combinations of the monetary
polices mentioned. A summary or the results is given in Table 1.
First, let us take the foreign country to pursue a passive monetary
policy (the elasticity k* of foreign period 2 money supply with respect to
foreign period 2 output equals zero), and let us vary the monetary policy of
the home country. This corresponds to column (a) in Table 1. From (5.4) and
(5.6a) we see that with a foreign passive monetary policy, the foreign
currency bonds is a perfect substitute for foreign stocks, since its return is
proportional to foreign period 2 output, r11(s) =y2=rf(s),for all s.It
is as if there were trade inclaims to foreign period 2 output instead of25
foreign currency bonds. This circumstance we denote by n =f23Furthermore,
since the marginal distributions of home and foreign period 2 outputs are




Thus,the home autarky risk measure for tile foreign currency bond is lower
than the foreign autarky measure, and there is a tendency for the home country
to import the the foreign currency bond. The foreign currency bond is a
perfect substitute for foreign stocks, which are a less risky in the home
country than in the foreign country. This result is denoted by "n=f: Import
in the first three rows in column (a) in Table 1.
Suppose the home country also pursues a passive monetary policy (the
elasticity k of home monetary supply with respect to home period 2 output
equals zero). This corresponds to row (1) in Table 1.It follows directly
fromthe reasoning above that with a passive home monetary policy the home
currency bond will be a perfect substitute for a claim to home period 2
output, r(s) =y2=rh(s),for all s. Since home stocks are riskier in the
homecountry (the autarky risk measure is lower), there will be a tendency for
thehome country to export tile home currency bond (denoted by "m=h: Export" in
the first two columns in row (1) in Table 1).
Suppose instead that the home country stabilizes the home period 2 price
level (the elasticity k equals unity). This corresponds to row (2). This
implies that the return on the home currency bond is sure, rm(s) =1,for all
23We say that two assets i and j with returns ri(s) andri(s) are perfect
substitutes if and only if r1(s) =r(s)
for all s, for some constant>0,
that is, if and only if their returnsareproportional. Then the asset prices
and q. fulfill q =aq.Two assets who are perfect substitutes are said
tobe effectively only one asset.26
s, and thehome currency bond is a perfect substitute for the indexed bond,
which we denote by m =0.Byassumptionautarky interest rates and hence the
autarkyasset prices on the indexedbond are equal. If the home currency bond
werethe only assettraded,we would knowthat it will be neither imported nor
exported in a trade in equilibrium. however, when the foreign currency bond
isalso traded, it does not necessarily follow that there will be no trade in
equilibriumin the home currency bond. We already know that there is a
tendency for the home country to import the foreign currency bond when the
foreign country pursues a passive monetary policy. hence in equilibrium there
should be (atendency to) export of either goods or home currency bonds, or
both,to balance the import of foreign currency bonds. We conclude that the
home currency bond can be either exported or imported (denoted by by tlm=O: ?"
in row (2) column (a)).
Next,let us consider the situation when the home country pursues a
one-sided peg and fixes the period 2 exchange rate, when the foreign country
still pursues a passive monetary policy. With a fixed exchange rate, home and
foreigil currency bonds become perfect substitutes, since by the Law of One
Price rh(s) =1/P2(s)=1/(P*2(s))=rf(s)[e,forall s. Furthermore, we
alreadyknow that the foreign currency bond is a perfect substitute to a claim
to foreign stocks, and that there is a tendency for the home country to import
the foreign currency bond. Since there is now effectively only one asset
traded,we even have an exact result rather than a tendency: The home country
will import the asset, have a capital account deficit and a current account
surplus. This is denoted in=n=f: Import' inrow(3) column (a).
Second, let us briefly consider the possibilities when the foreign
countrypursups aprice-level stabilizing policy (row (b) in Table1). Then
theforeign currency bond is a perfect substitute for the indexed bond. The
case when the home country pursues a passive monetary policy (row (1) column27
(b)) is of course identical to the case in row (2) and column (a), except that
the properties of home and foreign currency bonds are interchanged. Hence,
the home currency bond is a perfect substitute for home stocks, and there is a
tendencyfor the home country to export home currency bonds. The foreign
currency bond may or may not be imported into the home country.
When the home country also pursues a price-level stabilizingmonetary
policy(row (2) column (b)), both home and foreign currency bonds are perfect
substitutes for the indexed bond. Since the relevant autarky asset prices are
equal, and there is effectively only one asset traded, we have the exact
resultthat there will be no trade and that the capital and current accounts
will each be balanced. Also, since the exchange rate is constant, this policy
is equivalent to the home country pursuing a one- sided peg (row (3)
column (b)).
Third and last, let us consider the case when both countries engage in a
two-sided peg (row (4) column (c)). Since the period 2 exchange rate is
fixed, home and foreign currency bonds will be perfect substitutes (m=n). From
(5.1) and (5.8) it follows that the returnon home currency bonds is given by
(6.2) rh(s) = y2/M2(s) = (y2 +v*2)/L,for all s.
That is, home and foreign currency bonds are perfect substitutes for a claim
to world output (j=w) with returns r,(s) given by
(6.3) r(s) = y2 +y2,for all s.
Furthermore, since the marginal distributions of home and foreign
period 2 output by assumption are identical, it follows that
(6.4) 11m = = Cov[y2,r] = Cov[y*2,rw] =
Then by (4.7) the home and foreign autarky risk measures and hence autarky
asset prices are equal. Since there is effectively only one asset traded, we
have an exact result. There will be rio trade in equilibrium, and the current
and capital accounts will each be balanced.28
Wenotethe contrast to the case when both countries pursue a passive
monetarypolicy. That equilibrium effectively involves trade in both
countries stocks. Indeed, we realize that under assumptions (Al) and (A2),
the resulting equilibrium is the Pareto efficient perfectly pooled
equilibrium, where each country exports half of its stocks. Then, the capital
and current account will also be balanced, although there is nonzero gross
trade. In the case with the cooperative peg there is effectively oniy one
assets, claims to world output. Both net and gross trade are zero, and both
countries are effectively iii their autarky equilibrium.29
VII. Trade in Nominal Assets: Risk Aversion Differences
Next, we consider tile situation when the home country is more risk averse
than the foreign country. To isolate the effect of differences in attitudes
towards risk, we want to assume that the countries are identical in all other
aspects. We also want to make assumptions so as to equalize autarky real
interest rates so as to isolate the effect on the trade pattern in nominal
assets of assets' risk measures and the risk characteristics of monetary
policies. Since interteinporal substitution and attitude towards risk cannot
be separated when preferences are represented by an additively separable
expected utility function, some special considerations are required.
The home country being more risk averse means that the countries' von
Neuinann-Morgenstern utility functions are different. Everything else equal
this means that the autarky interest rates need not be equal, even if the
countries' period 2 outputs have the same marginal distribution or even if
their outputs are perfectly correlated and identical, since the expected
period 2 marginal utility in (4.2) need not be equal. Therefore, for autarky
interest rates to be equal, the subjective discount factor must be allowed to
differ, too. We hence make the following assumptions, which replace
(Al)- (A3) :24
(Al') The home and foreign countries are identical in all respects except
their von Neuinann-Morgenstern utility functions and their subjective
24Alternatively, we can use a special case of Selden's (1978) formulation,
which distinguishes between interteiiiporal preferences and attitudes towards
risk. The attitude towards risk is given by the risk utility function V(c),
by which the certainty equivalent period 2 consumption is defined by V(c2) =
E[V(c2(s)].The intertemporal preferences are then given by U(c1) + flU(c2).
We can thenassume that the two countries have different CARA risk utility
functions with the measures of absolute risk aversion fulfilling (A3'),
identical U(.) functions, and different subjective discount factors so as to
make autarky interest rates equal.
See Svensson (1987) and Persson and Svensson (1987) for applications of
Selden's formulation in similar contexts.30
discount factors. home and foreign period 2 output are equal and
hence perfectly correlated.
(A2') The subjective discount factors differ so as to make autarky
interest rates equal.
(A3') The von Neunianu-Morgenstern utility function has constant absolute
risk aversion. The home country is more risk averse, that is,
7 > 7*




itfollows that instead of the result (4.7) we now have
(7.4)q q IIll *Cov[y2,r]
0'"z,0.
That is, the home autarky risk measure for asset j is lower (higher) then the
foreign autarky risk measure for asset j if and only if the returns are
negatively (positively) correlated with home and foreign period 2 output, that
is, if and only if asset j is less (more) risky than the indexed bond. Hence,
there is a tendency for the more risk averse home country to import assets
that are less risky than the indexed bond, and to export assets that are more
risky than the indexed bond.
After this we are equipped to discuss how monetary policies affect the
trade pattern in nominal assets when the home country is more risk averse. We
consider the same combinations of monetary policy as above in section VI. The
results are summarized in Table 2.
Let us again first consider t]1e situation when the foreign country
pursues apassivemonetary policy (column (a) in Table 2). Then the foreign
currency bond is a perfect substitute for foreign stocks, but with home and
foreign output being perfectly correlated, home and foreign stocks are perfect
substitutes for a claim to world output. Furthermore, the covariance between31
period 2 output and world period 2 output is obviously positive. That is, a
claim to world output is more risky than the indexed bond. It follows that
themorerisk averse homecountry has a tendency toexport foreign currency
bonds (n=w: Export) whenever the foreign country pursues a passive policy.
Supposethe home country also pursues a passive monetarypolicy (row (1)
column (a)). Then the home currency bond is a perfect substitute for home
stocks,and hence aperfect substitute for world output and foreign currency
bonds. There is effectively only oneasset traded, and we have an exact
result.The home country will export the asset, and have a capital account
surplus and a current account deficit (m=n=w: Export). Since home and foreign
period 2 outputs are perfectly correlated, this policy combination by (5.3)
implies that the period 2 exchange rate is constant. Hence, the policy
combination is equivalent to the home country pursuing a one-sided peg
(row (3) column (a)). Since the policy conibination also implies that the
world money stock is constant, it is equivalent to a two-sided peg (row (4)
column (c)).
Suppose the home country instead stabilizes its price level (row (2)
column(a)). Then the home currency bond is a perfect substitute for the
indexed bond. Since autarky interest rates are equal, and there is more than
one asset available, we cannot say whether home currency bonds will be
exported or imported (m=O: ?).
Thecase when the foreign country stabilizes its price level and the home
country pursues a passive monetary policy (row (1) column (b)) is identical to
the previous casein row (2) andcolumn (a), except that the properties of
homeand foreign currency assets are interchanged (m=w: Export, n=O: ?).
Forthe case when both countries stabilize their price levels (row (2)
column (b)) home and foreign currency bonds are perfect substitutes for the
indexed bond. Autarky interest rates are equal and there is effectively only32
one asset traded. Then we have the exact result that there will be no trade
and zero capital and curreut accounts. Since the exchange rate is constant,
this case is identical to the foreign country pursuing a price-level
stabilizing policy, and the home country pursuing a one-sided peg (row (3)
column (b)).33
VIII.Conclusions
We have made assumptions so as to isolate the effect of price level and
exchange rate risk on the trade pattern in nominal assets. Although the model
allows for (almost) any specified real and nominal assets, in the end we have
looked closely only at the case of home and foreign currency bonds. In
particular we have assumed that home and foreign currency bonds are the only
assets traded, and therefore that tile asset market is incomplete. Since
price-level and exchange rate risk depend on monetary policies, we have
examined the effect of a few bench-mark monetary policies on the risk
characteristics of home and foreign currency bonds and on the pattern of trade
in such bonds. We have dealt with the two cases when the countries differ
either with respect to their period 2 outputs or with respect to their
attitudes towards risk.
Let us first summarize the results when the countries differ with respect
to their outputs, in that their period 2 outputs are less than perfectly
correlated.(i) Whenmonetary policies are such that the exchange rate is
variable,home and foreign currency bonds are imperfect substitutes. The risk
characteristics of acountryts currency bond depend directly on the country's
monetary policy. If the couutrys monetary policy is passive, the bond is a
perfect substitute for a claim the country's output, which is more risky for
thecountry than it is for the other country, and there is a tendency for the
country to export its currency bond. If the monetary policy is price-level
stabilizing,the bond is a perfect substitute for the indexed bond, andit may
be traded in any direction.(ii) When monetary policies are coordinated such
as to fix the exchange rate, home and foreign currency bonds are perfect
substitutes.Their risk characteristic depend on the coordinated monetary
policies. If the exchange rate regime is a one-sided peg, and if the
non-pegging country is pursuing a passivemonetarypolicy, home and foreign34
currencybonds are perfect substitutes for a claim to the non-pegging
countryts output. Then the non-pegging country will export home and foreign
currency bonds and have a capital account surplus and current account deficit.
If the non-pegging country is pursuing a price-level stabilizing policy, home
and foreign currency bonds are perfect substitutes for the indexed bond.
There will be no trade, and capital and current accounts will each be
balanced. If the exchange rate regime is a two-sided peg, home and foreign
currency bonds are perfect substitutes for a claim to world output, there will
be no trade, and capital and current accounts will each be balanced.
Second,let us summarize the results when the countries differ with
respect to their attitudes towards risk, in that the home country is more risk
aversethan tile foreign country. Their period 2 outputs are assumed to be
equal and hence perfectly correlated. Their autarky interest rates are
assumed to be equal.(i) When tile countries pursue different monetary
policies, the exchange rate is variable, and home and foreign bonds are
imperfect substitutes. For the country pursuing a passive monetary policy,
the countryt s currency bond is a perfect substitute for a claim to world
output, and there is a tendency for the bond to be exported by the more risk
averse home country. For the country pursuing a price-level stabilizing
policy, the countryts currency bond is a perfect substitute for the indexed
bond, and the bond may be traded iii ally direction.(ii) When the countries
monetary polices are coordinated and tile exchange rate is fixed, home and
foreign currency bonds are perfect substitutes. If tile exchange rate regime
is a one-sided peg, and if the non-pegging country is pursuing a passive
monetary policy, home and foreign currency bonds are perfect substitutes to a
claim to world output. Then tile more risk averse home country will export
home and foreign currency bonds and have a capital account surplus and current
account deficit. This case is identical to the two-sided peg, since world35
money supply is constant. If the non-pegging country is pursuing a
price-level stabilizing policy, home and foreign currency bonds are perfect
substitutes to the indexed bond, there will be no trade and both countries'
capital and current accounts will each be balanced.
We see that different monetary policies have dramatic effects on risk
characteristics of home and foreign currency bonds, which in turn has dramatic
effects on the pattern of trade and even the sign of the aggregate capital
accounts. The effects on the pattern of trade is of course not independent of
the assumption that home and foreign currency bonds are the only assets
traded. Monetary policy has real effects in this framework precisely because
asset markets are assumed to be incomplete, and because monetary policy
changes the risk characteristics of the real returns of available assets. If
indexed bonds and claims to home aiid foreign output is traded alongside with
home and foreign currency bonds, there is no effect on aggregate capital
accounts, for the different monetary policies we have considered. Neither is
there anyrelevanteffect on the pattern of trade in "effective" assets, since
the number of linearly independent effective assets then does not change. If
the asset market would be complete, in the sense of the the rank of the real
return matrix being equal to the number of states of the world, any monetary
policies would in the present framework have no real effects at all. Clearly,
it is not restrictive to assume that real world internatiollal capital markets
are incomplete. Even the simple case of trade in only home and foreign
currency bonds has an attractive realistic touch, I think. The amount of
international trade in equity is so far relatively small, although rising.
International trade in anything remotely similar to an indexed bond is, as far
as I know, completely insignificant.25
25Perhaps a partial explanation to why there is so little trade in indexed
bonds in the real world is that a bond indexed to one country's consumer price
index, say, would not in general be a perfect substitute for a bond indexed to36
These results also provide another demonstration of something that is by
now widely acknowledged, namely tlia,t reduced-form asset demand functions are
very sensitive to the policy regime, in this case the monetary policy and
exchange rate regime. For instance, the asset demand functions presumed in
simple variants of the portfolio-balance approach to exchange rate
determination are simply not stable over the policy experiments usually
considered.
The present framework can obviously easily incorporate a large variety of
real and nominal assets, and a large variety of monetary policies and exchange
rate regimes. Several goods caii be added to allow for a discussion of both
goods and asset trade. Let us however discuss some of the more severe
limitations inherent in the approach, and some related possible extensions.
The main advantage of Law of Comparative Advantage, in general and when
applied to our context, is that it requires information only about autarky
equilibria, and that it is iiot necessary to solve explicitly for the trade
equilibria. The main disadvantage is that it does not give exact results for
a given asset but only results in terms ofcorrelations,when there are more
than one asset available for international trade. Roughly, the larger the
number of assets, the less precise the prediction for each individual asset.
More specific results about the pattern and volume of trade, for instance from
comparative statics experiments, requires the direct study of the trade
equilibria. Since it is frequently more difficult to solve for trade
equilibria than for autarky equilibria, solvability of the trade equilibria
may require additional restrictions on the model, restrictions not needed when
the Law of Comparative Advantage is used. Persson and Svensson (1987) make
another country's CPI, since the OPTs would generally differ. On a micro
level, a bond iiidexed to one investor's individual CPI would generally not be
aperfect substitute to a bond indexed to another investor's individual OPT if
their preferences and consumption baskets differ.37
additional assumptions that allow explicit and simple solutions of such trade
equilibria, and undertake a more specific study of how exchange rate
variability determine trade patterns and trade volumes in asset trade
equilibria.
An important simplifying aspect of the specific model we use is that
assets' real return risk characteristics, suniniarized by the the real return
matrix, depends only oii outputs and monetary policies. Once the stochastic
properties of outputs and monetary policies are specified, the real return
matrix is given. In particular. for given monetary policies, the real return
matrix is the same in autarky and in a trade equilibrium. If output is
endogenously determined (for instance because investment is incorporated), or
ifthedemand for money is specified insomeother way than with the
cash-in-advanceconstraints we have assumed, the real return matrix would in
general not be exogenous once monetary policy is specified. In particular,
the real return matrix would iiigeneral not be the same in a trade equilibrium
asinan autarky equilibrium.26
Our approach can however still I)e used also when the real return matrix
isdifferentin autarky and intrade equilibria. The trick is to derive the
real return matrix in the trade equilibrium, and then take that real return
matrix as given and compute the corresponding hypothetical autarky asset
prices for the given real return matrix. These hypothetical autarky prices
then predict the pattern of trade in assets. Of course, the operation
requires the solution of (at least part of) the trade equilibrium.
26This complication also arises inthebarter economy with real assets like
claimsto output, when output is ciidogeiious. See Svensson (1987) for a
discussion within the context of the barter economy of that complication and
related ones when there many periods.38
There is a related, and perhaps more fundamental, problem with applying
the Law of Comparative Advantage iiiaiiionetary economy. The law requires the
Gains-from-Trade Theorem to hold. The Gains-from-Trade Theorem need not hold
if there are domestic distortions in autarky. Hence, it is crucial how money
is introduced. More specifically, it is crucial whether or not money is
introduced in such a way that the autarky equilibrium is distorted, that is,
whether or not the autarky equilibrium is Pareto efficient. When money is
introduced via cash-in-advance constraints and output is exogenous, the
autarky equilibrium is Pareto efficient (this is a special case of the result
by Helpman (1981) mentioned above, that a monetary trade equilibrium is
equivalent to a barter trade equilibrium). If money is introduced in a
different way so as to make the autarky equilibrium not Pareto efficient, it
must be checked whether there still are gains from trade, before the Law of
Comparative Advantage can be used. Whether there are gains from trade will
obviously depend on the details of how the demand for money is modeled, and on
what monetary policies are being pursued. Further research is needed on this
issue.39
Appendix: The Seiuence of Markets and Transactions
The precise sequence of markets and transactions is the following. In
the beginning of period 1 the consumer receives a transfer of homecurrency,
front the home government. (This transfer equals the period 1supplyof
homecurrency.) After that he can trade currencies and assets on the world
asset market. He takes the set J of assets and the return matrix r as given.
Let and N1 denote his holdings of home and foreign currency after trading
on the asset market. His budget constraint is then
(A.1) M1 + etN1+ <i1
where =()EJis the J-vector of assetprices interms of home currency,
andQ1z denotes the inner product After the transactions on the asset
market are completed, the consumer can purchase goods on the goods market. He
must pay for goods produced in the home country with home currency, and for
goods produced in the foreign country with foreign currency. Hence, he faces
the liquidity constraints
(A.2) P1c ￿ and p*l4 N1,
where P1 and are the goods prices in home and foreign currency, andc1 and
4areconsumption of goods produced in the home and foreign country. Coods
produced in the home and foreign country are perfect substitutes in
consumption, and total period 1consumptionis
(A.3) c1 =c+ 4.
Atthe end of period 1, or in the beginning of period 2, the consumer
receives revenues in home currency from tile sale of home output. He learns
the state of the world in period 2,andreceives a state-dependent cash
transferfrom the home government and tile state- dependent currency returns on
hisassets. He can then trade on a world currency market in the beginning of
period 2. His budget constraint in state s, is
(A.4) M2(s) + e2(s)N2(s)P1y1 + (i2(s)11)+
(M1-P1c)40
+ e2(s)(NlP*l4) + P2(s)r(s)z.
The terms on the right-hand side are revenues from sales of home period 1
output,the cash transfer from the home government(which equals the expansion
ofthe home money supply), home currency left over from the goods market in
period 1, the value in home currency of foreign currency left over from the
goods market in period 1 (e2(s) is the state-dependent exchange rate in period
2),and the home currency value of the return on assets. (The expression
r(s)z denotes product Er(s)z.)27 On the left-hand side, M2(s) and N2(s)
are the holdings of home and foreign currency after trade on the currency
market is completed.
After the currency market, the consumer can by goods produced at home and
abroad in the goods market, facing the liquidity constraints
(A.5) P2(s)c(s) <M(s)and P*2(s)c(s)￿ N(s), for all s,
where c(s) and c1(s) are consumption of goods produced in the home and
foreign country, respectively. Total consumption in period 2 is
(A.6) c2(s) =c(s)+ c(s),for all s.
Towards the end of period 2 the consumer receives revenues P2(s)y2 in
home currency from the sales of home output in state s in period 2. He has to




(The second term on the right-hand side is home currency left over from the
period 2goodsmarket.)
27Thehome currency value of the ieturns, P2(s)r(s)z, equals the sum of
returns on home currency assets, andthe home currency value of
foreigncurrency assets, e2(s)JEJ*R1(s)zJ, whereJ*CJdenotesthe subset of
foreigncurrency assets.41
Thehome consumer's decision problem is hence to choose consumption
(c1,(c2(s))), currency holdings (I1JI2(s)) and (N1,N2(s)), and asset importz,
so as to maximize the expected utility function (2.3) subject to the
constraints (A.1)- (A.7).
Thehome government supplies home currencyin period 1, and M2(s) in
state s in period 2, via net transfers to the home consumer. It also levels
the tax T3(s) oii the home consumer at tile end of period 2. This tax has to be
paid in home currency, but is is indexed such that its real value is equal to
home period 2 output in state s. hence it is given by28
(A.8) T3(s) =P2(s)y2,for all s.
This completes the description of the home country's transactions. The
foreign country also consists of a representative consumer and a government.
The foreign consumer chooses consumption (c*',c*2(s)), currency holdings
(M*l,M*2(s)) and (N*l,N*2(s)), andassetimport z, so as to maximize his
expected utility subject to a similar sequence of constraints as the home
consumer. At the beginning of period 1 the foreign consumer receives a
transfer N1 of foreign currency from the foreign government. Thereafter he
can trade on the world asset and goods market and then faces constraints
analogto (A.1)- (A.3). As the home consumer, he takes the set J of assets and
the return matrix r as given. At tile beginning of period 2 the foreign
consumerreceives foreign currenc revenues from sales of foreign period 1
output, a foreign currency transfer N2(s)-N1 from its government, and returns
on its assets. The foreign consumer trades on the period 2 currency andgoods
28Theonly role of this tax is toprovidea rationale for the sale of
period 2 output, even thoughthe revenues reach the consumer after the goods
marketis closed. If the tax is introduced it need to be defined in real
termsto give a determinatepricelevel iii the secondperiod. Alternatively,
onecan disregard the tax, and simply assume that period 2 output is supplied
and sold even though there is no use for the cash revenues received.42
markets and then faces constraints analog to (A.4)-(A.6). Finally, at the end
of period 2 the foreign consumer receives foreign currency revenues from sales
offoreignperiod 2 output, and must pay a tax T*3(s) in foreign currency to
theforeign government, hence facing the constraint analog to (A.7),
(A.9) 0P*2(s)y*2+ (N*2(s)P*2(s)c2(s)) -T*3(s),for all s.
The foreign government supplies foreign currency (N,N2(s)) and levies
the tax T*3(s) in foreigncurrenc.y at the end of period 2such that the taxts
realvalueis equal to foreign period 2 output, that is,
(A.1O) T*3(s) =P*2(s)y*2,for all s.
Equilibrium on the asset market in period 1 requires that demand and
supply of currencies are equal, and that home and foreign asset import sum to
zero. That is,
(A.11) + = N1 +N*l=N1,and
(A.12) z1 +z=0.
Equilibriumin the goods market iiiperiod 1 requires that home and foreign
consumptionof goods produced in the home country, and in the foreign country,
are equal to output of goods in the home and foreign country, that is,
(A.13) c +c
=y1and 4+ c1=y*1.
Equilibrium on the period 2 currency market in each state of the world
requires
(A.14) M2(s) +M*2(s)=I2(s)and N2(s) +N*2(s)N(s), for all s.




Theequilibrium can be determined from these market equilibrium
conditionsandthe behavioral functions derived from the home and foreign
consumers'decision problems. There is. however, a much simpler way to
determine the equilibrium. The trick is to use binding liquidity constraints
to simplify theconsumers' budget constraints.More precisely, we shall show43
that consumers' budget constraints in equilibrium are equivalent to those in a
barter economy.
First, let us note that from (A.7)-(A.1O) it follows that in equilibrium
the liquidity constraints (A.5) and their analogs for the foreign country are
binding in each state in period 2.(Constraint (A.5) for foreign currency
must bind if the consumer maximizes his utility. Constraints (A.7) and (A.8)
imply (A.5), hence the consumer caii in equilibrium fulfill (A.7) and still let
(A.5) for home currency bind.) Together with the goods market equilibrium
conditions (A.15) this implies that the home and foreign price levels in
period 2 fulfill the quantity-theory (-of-money) equations
(A.16) P2(s) =M2(s)/y2and P*2(s)N2(s)/y*2, for all s,
that is, (5.1).
Underthe assumption that the nominal interest rates on home and foreign
currency bonds are positive itisoptimal for the home and foreign consumers
notto hold any excess cash. Then it follows that the period 1 liquidity
constraints (A.2) and their analogs for the foreign country are binding, which
together with the period 1 goods market equilibrium condition (A.13) implies
that the period 1 home and foreign price levels fulfill the quantity-theory
equat ioiis29
29Ifthe nominal interest rateon home currency bonds, say, is zero (that
is,if thenominal price onthe period 1 asset marketof a claim to a sure
unitof home currency in period 2 is equal to unity, 1/(1+i) == 1)the
consumers are indifferent to the amount of excess home currency balances they
hold. It can be shown that the period 1 home price level then is independent
of period 1 home currency supply and given by the more complicated equation
P1 =U(c1)/flE{U(c2)y2/I2]￿ yt/M1. The equivalence of the monetary
equilibrium with that of a barter economy still holds, as Helpman (1981) has
demonstrated for the certainty case. (The argument for the uncertainty case
is easy to construct.)
Our results about the trade patterii in nominal assets is independent of
whether period 1 liquidity constraints bind or not.44
(A.17) P1 = and =Nh/y*l.
We also note that in equilibriuiii the Law of One Price must hold. If it
would not, home and foreign consumers would shift all their demand towards
goods from one country. Hence,
(A.18) P1 =e'P*land P2(s) =e2(s)P*2(s),for all s,
that is, (5.2)
It follows from (A.16)-(A.18) that the exchange rate equations are
(A.19) e1 =(Mh/Nl)(y*l/yl)and e2(s) =(M2(s)/N2(s))(y*2/y2),for all s,
that is, (5.3).
Using the quantity equations and the Law of One Price, it is easy to see
that the period 1 budget and licjuidity constraints for the home consumer can
be simplified to P1c1 +Q1z=P1y1,or
(A.20) c1 +qz=y1,
where q =(q)
(t/P1) is the J-vector of asset prices measured in goods.
This implies (2.7). Similarly, tile period 2 budget constraint simplifies to
P2(s)c2(s) ￿ P2(s)y2 +P2(s)r(s)z,or
(A.21) c2(s) y2 +r(s)z,for all s,
that is, (2.5).45
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Table 1. Summary of Results: Outvut Differences
(a) (b) (c)
Foreignpolicy: Passive Stable price level Two-sided peg
(k*=O) (k*=1)
Home policy:
(1) Passive ni=h: Export nih: Export
(k=O) n=f: Import n=O: ?
(2) Stable m=O: ? m=n=O: No trade
price level n=f: Import
(k=1)
(3) One-sided m=n=f: Import iii=n=O: No trade
peg
(4) Two-sided m=n=w: No trade
peg
Table 2. Summary of Results: Home Country More Risk Averse
(a) (b) (c)
Foreign policy: Passive Stable price level Two-sided peg
(k*=O) (k*=1)
Home policy:
(1) Passive m=n=w: Export iu=w:Export
(k=O) nO: ?
(2)Stable m=O: ? iti=n=O: No trade
price level n=w: Export
(k=1)
(3) One-sided m=nw: Export iii=ii=O: No trade
peg
(4) Two-sided m=n=w: Export
peg
"Export" and "Import't for an asset denotes a tendency for the home
country to export or import the asset. "?"denoteseither export or, import
(autarky asset prices are equal butotherassets are also traded). "No trade"
denotes neither export nor import (autarky asset prices are equal, and no
other asset is traded).